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Nutrition and Health in 
North Korea: What’s New, 
What’s Changed and 
Why It Matters1
Hazel Smith
Structured Abstract
Article Type: Research Paper
Purpose—To examine the changing health and nutritional status of the North
Korean population since the famine of the mid–1990s and the dominant perspective
that little has changed since in the DPRK.
Design, Methodology, Approach—Using hitherto neglected data from major
international organizations, this research charts the  little- known changes in patterns
of food availability and food accessibility in aggregate, national terms, with some
disaggregation of the data by gender and age. The DPRK is compared to other poor
countries, other Asian countries and near neighbors in East Asia.
Findings—Despite a precarious economy, the end of systematic food provision
by the government, and a decline in aid from international organizations after 2001,
the data shows that by the mid–2010s, national levels of severe wasting, an indication
of  famine- like conditions in the population, were lower than in other low income
countries globally and lower than those prevailing in other developing countries in
East Asia and the Pacific. Poverty and  ill- health remained—as shown especially in
terms of maternal health and infant mortality—but the incidence of malaria sharply
declined and although the incidence of tuberculosis was up, the numbers of fatalities
from both malaria and TB sharply declined.
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Practical Implications—This research contributes to a shift in North Korean
Studies from securitized,  opinion- based discussions in which North Koreans are
either “victims or villains,” and which very often obscures or ignores mundane but
important facts on the ground, towards careful, qualified,  data- based analysis of
societal change in the  post- famine era of marketization in the DPRK.
Originality, Value—The research shows that  post- famine DPRK is not the out-
lier state that is commonly presented in scholarly, policy and global media analysis.
Key words: health, mortality,  life- expectancy, North Korea, nutrition
Introduction
The North Korean famine of the mid–1990s is  well- known and  well- researched
in terms of causation, processes, outcomes and consequences.2 Much less is known,
however, about the changing health and nutritional status of the population since
the famine and, indeed, the dominant perspective is that nothing much has changed
in the DPRK.3 Yet, despite a precarious economy, the end of systematic government
provision of food to the population, and a decline in assistance from international
organizations after 2001, the data shows that by the mid–2010s, national levels of
severe wasting, an indication of  famine- like conditions in the population, were lower
than in other low income countries globally and on a par with those prevailing in
other developing countries in East Asia and the Pacific. Poverty and  ill- health
remained—as shown especially in terms of maternal health and infant mortality—
but the incidence of malaria sharply declined and although the incidence of tuber-
culosis was up, the numbers of fatalities from both malaria and TB fell substantially.4
The incidence of deaths from  vaccine- preventable disease fell. By 2013, the major
killers in North Korea were  non- communicable diseases including cancers and car-
diovascular diseases, which are commonly understood as diseases of wealthy coun-
tries.5
This article proceeds by outlining the sources and types of data; it then charts
changes in food availability and patterns of accessibility in the  post- famine period
before showing changes in the nutritional and health status of the population in
aggregate, national terms with some disaggregation of the data by gender and age.
It proceeds by offering comparative analysis between the DPRK and other poor
countries, other Asian countries and near neighbors in East Asia. The analysis shows
that indications of poverty and  ill- health among the population remained worrying
but that  post- famine DPRK is far from the outlier state that is commonly presented
in scholarly, policy and global media analysis.6
Data
This research is founded on underutilized primary sources, mainly from inter-
national organizations (IOs), including UNICEF, WHO, WFP and FAO; the DPRK,
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ROK and United States government agencies; NGOs; and it makes some use of
analysis based on defector interviews.
International humanitarian agencies became resident in the DPRK in response
to the health and food emergency of the 1990s. They provided food and heath assis-
tance but they also, as in every other health emergency in the world in which they
are involved, sought to measure nutritional and health status and to report their
findings to donors and the DPRK government. The two main objectives of such
reporting were to generate funding for humanitarian assistance and to provide an
informational base to help shape policies to prevent a recurrence of humanitarian
crisis.
Much of the data is in the areas of agriculture, health, and nutrition, as these
are the core sectors in which the humanitarian agencies operate in the DPRK. The
data is both quantitative and qualitative. It is not comprehensive but it is, perhaps
surprisingly, extensive and sufficient to allow for a more profound knowledge of the
 well- being of the population than was hitherto possible prior to the advent of resident
international organizations in the DPRK.
Disaggregated data by gender, age and geographical location became available
as the mandate was to target the most vulnerable groups and women, especially
mothers, children and the elderly were prioritized for assistance as were those living
in the more remote and poorer areas of the country. Nutritional, health, agricultural
and educational data was, therefore, routinely collected and analyzed at provincial
level, and often at county level. Since much of the data was collected to help fulfill
the mission of the humanitarian organizations, rather than for generic, national sta-
tistical purposes, the empirical data is fairly rich for women and young children but
is relatively sparse for adult males and adolescents of both sexes. Generic data also
exists, however; substantial data is available for example from the 1993 and 2008
DPRK censuses, the latter which was developed and implemented with help from
the UN Population Fund.7
While all this data requires careful evaluation, it nevertheless permits a nuanced
analysis of changing conditions of life for the population. The 2008 census, for exam-
ple, reports teenage pregnancies in the DPRK.8 The numbers reported are small but
the fact that they are reported at all indicates a change in social attitudes since the
first census of 1993, which did not include any teenage pregnancy data, thereby
refusing to admit that teenage girls got pregnant in the DPRK.9 A systematic com-
parison of regional nutritional outcomes with regional agricultural productivity also,
for example, demonstrates that improved nutritional outcomes for individuals are
not necessarily synonymous with living in an agriculturally productive area, a long-
standing central assumption of much of international organizations’ understanding
of  well- being in North Korea.10
The DPRK does not publish systematic economic data for outside consumption
and this article therefore relies on South Korea’s Bank of Korea (BOK) for basic eco-
nomic indicators.11 The Bank of Korea regularly publishes estimated DPRK economic
data but also warns that the data should be used with caution. Nevertheless, the data
is useful to illustrate broad trends and, given the widespread acceptance of BOK data
                                               Nutrition and Health in North Korea                                           9
as the standard source that provides a “good enough” picture of the DPRK economy,
it is also used in this article.
The 26,000 North Koreans living in Seoul have provided a variety of different
agencies and researchers with information relevant to this research although it is
difficult to generalize from these experiences as the accounts are statistically unrep-
resentative of a country of roughly 25 million people. Information gleaned from
“defectors,” referred to by Sung Kyung Kim, among others, as “border-crossers,” in
an effort to recognize the complexity of the emigration experience of North Koreans
has also generated controversies, because of the vulnerability of such testimony to
distortion for partisan reasons and/or because of the amateur fashion—“finding
facts to fit the opinion”—in which these accounts are sometimes used.12 Nevertheless,
where  border- crosser testimony has been combined with other data and profession-
ally analyzed, these sources have provided some high quality analysis.13
In summary, the  socio- economic data compiled and collated by the major inter-
national organizations, especially the United Nations agencies. UNICEF, the WHO,
the FAO, the UNDP and the World Bank provide the core material for this research.14
The advantage of United Nations data is it has been systematically and professionally
quality-checked and is generally comparable given the  data- sharing arrangements
in the UN system (of which the World Bank is part for the purposes of the collection,
organization and emission of data). The intrinsic problems of data collection and
compilation from poor countries and countries in conflict as well as the difficulties
in comparative analysis are  well- understood by United Nations statisticians. These
data sets are largely uncontroversial and the data is sufficiently robust to allow for
reasonably reliable comparative analysis.15
Famine and the International Response
It is now  well- known that the DPRK went into economic freefall in the 1990s.
The primary cause of decline remains debatable but the outcomes were uncontestably
awful. Best estimates showed that in the resultant famine up to one million of the
then population of 23 million died of hunger and malnutrition related disease.16 The
effects of the famine were  far- reaching—including, among other things, orphaned
children and destitute adults.17 Unemployment, underemployment and an almost
worth less currency (the North Korean won) meant that day to day life became a strug-
gle for physical survival. International humanitarian organizations responded to the
extreme risks to life and health with the provision of  large- scale aid, mainly with
food assistance, which reached its zenith in terms of volume and value in 2000/2001.18
Figure 1 shows the DPRK economy’s precipitous decline in the 1990s and the
gradual recovery from the 2000s onwards; it also shows that the DPRK remained a
poor country with average per capita gross national income never rising much over
U.S.$1,000.
As a response to famine, the United States, the Republic of Korea, and Japan, the
largest food aid donors to the DPRK, donated food aid through, and in coordination
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with, the World Food Programme (WFP), the only global agency with the necessary
logistical capacity and experience of bulk aid transfers. The United States, for example,
channeled over ninety per cent of its food aid to the DPRK through the WFP.21 It is
notoriously difficult to give precise figures as to totals of food and other assistance,
given the myriad of small  non- resident NGOs that were engaged with the DPRK, but
because the overwhelmingly largest amount of bulk food aid to the DPRK came via
the WFP, Figure 2 provides a useful indicator of trends in food aid to the DPRK.22
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Figure 1. DPRK Economic Indicators
Sources: * Bank of Korea, “Gross Domestic Product indicators for the North Korean economy” (Annual
report, 2013).19
** Bank of Korea, “Gross Domestic Product Indicators for the North Korean Economy” (Annual reports,
2000–2013, except for the years 2003, 2004 and 2005).20
Key:
1: All figures in this row converted from Korean won at the exchange rate prevailing in August 2015. 
2: All figures in this row given in the original documents in U.S.$.
†The two different figures for 2009 GNI both come from the Bank of Korea annual reports. The higher
figure is from the 2009 report and the lower figure from the 2010 report.
Figure 2. World Food Programme Food Aid 
to the DPRK (in thousand metric tons)
Source: Figures derived from World Food Programme.23
World Food Programme food aid rose from 5,000 metric tons in 1995 (not
shown in Figure 2 as the scale is too large). Figure 2 shows that at the height of the
food assistance programme in 2000/2001, WFP imported almost one million tons
of the five million tons of food required to feed the population at a basic level for
one year. In 2000/2001 WFP provided food to eight million people, a third of the
country’s population. Figure 2 also shows, however, the sharp decrease in volumes
of WFP food aid to the DPRK from the early 2000s onwards. Volumes of food assis-
tance, in cash and metric tonnes never again reached the astonishing heights of the
late 1990s. The U.S. government Congressional Research Service confirmed the
downward trend; it reported that “since 2009 donations from all countries except
China have dwindled to a minimal amount.”24
Despite the decrease in international assistance, the major international human-
itarian and development agencies remained in the DPRK. These included the UNDP,
FAO, WHO, WFP and UNICEF; the International Federation of the Red Cross and
Red Crescent (IFRC); the resident bilateral governmental agencies including the
Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation; and resident NGOs, including
Welthungerhilfe (German AgroAction) and Concern Worldwide.25 International
organisations food security priorities changed, however; from the provision of emer-
gency relief via bulk grains provision to targeted interventions, focusing on the nutri-
ent deficiencies in the diet of most North Koreans.26 These agencies also continued
to collect and systematize data: mainly in the agriculture, nutrition, health and edu-
cation sectors.
Food Availability
One reason for changing international humanitarian priorities was the improve-
ment in national food availability, a term that refers to aggregate food stocks totals
from production and from imports. Cereal availability provides an important food
availability indicator because cereals provide a cheap way to provide basic energy
even though cereals alone do not allow for a wholly nutritious diet. Adequate cereal
availability, however, is an indicator that a country has the potential to avoid star-
vation. In the DPRK the  rule- of-thumb basic cereal availability target figure—used
to indicate whether there was enough to feed the population at basic levels of sus-
tenance—remained around five million metric tons per annum.27
Figure 3, drawn from UN Food and Agriculture statistical reporting, shows the
precipitous decline in DPRK domestic production of cereals in the 1990s and the
continued inability to produce the five million tons of cereal from domestic agri-
culture until the mid–2000s. Figure 3 also shows that domestic cereal production
never again reached the reported high output of the early 1990s and international
agencies continued to be concerned about the sustainability of the modest agricul-
tural recovery of the 2000s.28
12                                           NORTH KOREAN REVIEW, SPRING 2016
Food Accessibility
International agencies continued to warn that DPRK food security remained
precarious but priorities changed from that of food availability to that of food acces-
sibility, which in development studies and policy refers to the ability of individuals
and households to secure their own food through purchasing, household production
and/or other means. A shift from reliance on the government to the  semi- legal mar-
ket meant that tracing who got what food became more difficult for the international
agencies and also meant that, in the  post- famine era, food security for many indi-
viduals was neither predictable nor stable.30
Prior to the famine, food accessibility was almost exclusively via the government
ration system. The  government- directed and -managed public distribution system
had allocated and distributed a food ration to every household based on a matrix of
age, gender and occupation, at highly subsidized prices.31 The old system was fairly
transparent and, although it did not always succeed in its aims, as food shortages
were a perennial system characteristic and were sometimes severe as in the early
1970s’  near- famine conditions, food had remained cheap to the extent of being almost
free.32 The universal food rationing system collapsed after the economic and social
catastrophe of the mid–1990s, however, and the government never recovered the
capacity to  re- constitute the system.33
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Figure 3. DPRK Domestic Production of Cereals, 1990–2013
Source: FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations Statistics Division, http://faostat3.
fao. org/compare/E29
Post-famine, the government abandoned the objective of providing a universal
ration. The new aim was to provide a flat ration of basic grain to “key workers” that
included the military (but not their families), the miners and some Party officials.34
Food available through the ration system remained cheaper than market prices but
not as cheap as in the  pre- famine era nor did the ration apply to the entire household.
The  key- worker ration was allocated to the individual worker and did not provide
food for the worker’s family even in principle and it was also insufficient to sustain
life and  well- being for the person to whom it was allocated. Furthermore, ration
entitlement did not always translate into actual receipt of rations as what remained
of the public distribution system was not always supplied with food. Increases in
agricultural output or food availability did not translate into a reconstitution of the
 pre- famine ration system.
Survey after survey of defectors in South Korea reported a shift from complete
reliance on government provisioned food and other goods in the  pre- famine era to
almost complete reliance on the market in the  post- famine era.35 In short,  post-
famine food accessibility was almost entirely a private affair. Markets varied in form
from large government licensed market places in all major cities through to petty
traders operating on street corners and in apartment blocks. Market pricing, market
mechanisms and market values of individual  self- interest became institutionalized
in the  post- famine society even as government pronouncements continued to prom-
ulgate the old collective norms.36 One reason for the rapid uptake and inculcation
of these new societal norms was that Party and security officials at every level relied
on the markets’ operations to feed themselves and their families since the govern-
ment could not provide a living wage or regular food rations. In these circumstances,
there was little incentive for middle or local level officials to crack down on  semi-
legal or grey area market operations.
The  Post- Famine Nutritional Status of the Population
National surveys measuring DPRK malnutrition were carried out by interna-
tional humanitarian agency staff comprised of international and local (North
Korean) officials and were designed and analyzed by global nutritional consultants.
These surveys measured chronic malnutrition, acute malnutrition and severe mal-
nutrition through the nutritional classifications of stunting, wasting and severe wast-
ing. “Stunting” or low height for age is the nutritionist’s standard worldwide
indicator of chronic malnutrition in a population. “Wasting” or low weight for height
is a standard indicator of acute malnutrition in a given population. Rates of stunting
and wasting comprise two key indicators of malnutrition in a given population.
Nutritionists also measure degrees of malnutrition. “Severe wasting” is an indication
of or  famine- like conditions in a population while “under-weight” is a more expan-
sive category that indicates dietary deficiencies of differing degrees.
In 2006 UNICEF reported that nutrition surveys in 1998, 2000, 2002 and 2004
had provided comparable data and analysis, despite “select differences … [because
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of] their extensive scope, similar design and sampling methods.”37 Subsequent nutri-
tional surveys in 2009 and 2012 maintained similar methodologies such as to allow
for comparison over time. Table 1 shows the findings of the major international
agencies in terms of changing stunting and wasting rates in the DPRK.
Table 1. Chronic and Acute Malnutrition 
in the DPRK, 1998–2012 (% of population)
Sources:
* UNICEF, “Analysis of the Situation of Women and Children in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,
2006.”38
** United Nations Country Team, “DPR Korea 2015: Needs and Priorities,” 2015.39
*** World Bank, “World Development Indicators 2015.40
The accumulated survey findings show a profound nutritional crisis in the 1990s:
a finding supported by hundreds of qualitative accounts from international offi-
cials working in the DPRK from the mid–1990s onwards.41 From the late 1990s
onwards, however, rates of chronic and acute malnutrition fell to the point where
the consensus view of the international humanitarian agencies, as reported by
UNICEF in 2012, was that a humanitarian food and health emergency no longer
existed: “the [humanitarian] situation is not critical and does not suggest emergency
operations.”42
The  Post- Famine Health Status of the Population
Standard health status indicators of a given population include infant, child
and maternal mortality rates.43 Other indicators include the incidence of vaccine
preventable disease such as polio, measles, mumps, rubella and diphtheria. The inci-
dence of  non- communicable disease like cancer and cardiovascular diseases is an
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indicator of the health of a society while the incidence of communicable diseases
like TB and malaria, which are classic diseases of poverty, provide further clues as
to a society’s aggregate health status. Changes in life expectancy rates over time pro-
vide an aggregate picture of  well- being; in some countries these figures are affected
by war and armed conflict but in the DPRK’s case, where hot war did not occur in
the post–Cold War period, rates are primarily reflective of living conditions. Trends
in these health indicators over time also provide significant information regarding
the effectiveness of governmental public health policies and programmes.
Mortality Rates
A 2013 South Korean study reported that the DPRK mortality rate was not
exceptionally high in global comparative terms. It commented that:
The  age- standardized death rate of North Korea was 858 out of 100,000. This
value was higher than South Korea’s 436 or China’s 731, but it was lower than
those of fellow SEAR [South-East Asia region] countries like India’s 1147 and
Indonesia’s 961 and around the same level as Egypt’s 860 and Jordan’s 873, which
have been reported to be countries with relatively higher income levels than
North Korea. Globally, the  age- standardized death rate of North Korea ranked in
the middle among all of the WHO member states and was the second lowest in
the SEAR countries following that of Maldives.44
Nevertheless, neither snapshot nor national aggregated data tells the whole story.
Probably more useful for assessing the relative competence of any government is to
look at trends over time and to disaggregate the data.  Policy- makers  world- wide
tend to focus on trends in infant, child and maternal mortality rates as indicators
of whether the needs of a society’s most vulnerable are being met.
Infant mortality is a term used for the death of a child before his/her first birth-
day. The standard infant mortality rate definition is “the number of infants dying
before reaching one year of age, per 1,000 live births in a given year.”45 Child mortality
is a term used for the death of a child before his/her fifth birthday. The child or
“[u]nder-five mortality rate is the probability per 1,000 that a  new- born baby will
die before reaching age five, if subject to  age- specific mortality rates of the specified
year.”46 In broad terms, maternal mortality refers to deaths as a result of problems
during pregnancy and during childbirth. The maternal mortality rate “is the number
of women who die from  pregnancy- related causes while pregnant or within 42 days
of pregnancy termination per 100,000 live births.”47
Table 2 shows trends over time in respect to infant, child and maternal mortality
in the DPRK. The figures in table 2 sometimes differ from each other for the same
year as the standard operating procedures of all international agencies (in all coun-
tries where they work) is to review and revise data in the light of new information
and changing statistical techniques. The data from more recent publications is there-
fore likely to be more robust than from earlier publications. The mortality data for
the famine years may also be  under- stated given there is little evidence of robust
state data collection in those years.
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Table 2. DPRK Mortality Rates, 1990–2012
Sources: * UNICEF, “DPRK at a Glance 2013 (February).”48
** UNICEF, “Analysis of the Situation of Women and Children in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,
2006.”49
*** World Health Organization (WHO), “Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Neonatal and Child Health
Country Profile.”50
**** UNICEF, “Analysis of the Situation of Women and Children in the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea 1999.”51
**** World Bank, “World Development Indicators 2015.”52
Table 2 shows the worsening infant, child and maternal mortality of the 1990s
but it also shows falling mortality rates from 2005 onwards. Even with these post
2005 improvements, however, infant and maternal mortality rates, only fell to the
levels prevailing in 1990.
Noticeably improved was child mortality, which shows a drop from 45 in 1990
to 29 in 2012.53 Child mortality was reduced by roughly 50 per cent, from 58 at 
the immediate aftermath of the famine in 2000 to 29 in 2012. The Millennium Devel-
opment Goal (MDG) global target for  under- five or child mortality, however, was
for a two thirds reduction between 1990 and 2015. The DPRK did not achieve 
these MDG goals as it reduced child mortality by only 30 per cent in those years,
approximately 50 per cent less than the average world figure for child mortality
reduction.
The Decrease in Vaccine Preventable Disease
The World Health Organization, which has operated in the DPRK since the
1990s but only established an office  in- country in 2001, has few data for the famine
years, although the  post- famine data is useful and revealing. Table 3 shows a spike
in the incidence of common vaccine preventable diseases in the first part of the
2000s but it also shows a quite rapid decline in incidence of these diseases after the
measles outbreak of 2007.54 The spike probably represents better reporting; the fig-
ures for the late 2000s seem credible, however, as they mirror mortality rate trends.
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Table 3. Incidence of Vaccine Preventable 
Disease DPRK, 1990–2014
Source: World Health Organization (WHO), “WHO  Vaccine- preventable Diseases: Monitoring System. 2015
Global Summary.”55
Key: Blank spaces show no data collected or made available to WHO.
The rather simple explanation for the trend towards falling disease rates for
vaccine preventable disease, despite a stuttering economy, is the continued national
vaccination campaigns that the government continued to implement, supported by
funding from the international organizations and governments, including the Repub-
lic of Korea.56 South Korean analyses are right to call into question the complete
efficacy of these campaigns given the “cold-chain” issues of keeping a vaccine at
optimal temperatures in its travel from central stores to recipient but they also note
that “North Korea reports that its vaccination rate for essential communicable dis-
eases has reached the level of the developed countries.”57
Malaria and TB: A Mixed Picture
Prior to the collapse of Kim Il Sungism, malaria and TB were probably largely
controlled, although the data is not sufficient to quantify the incidence and preva-
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lence of these diseases for that period. WHO data from the late 1990s, however,
shows the country experienced a very rapid rise in malaria and TB cases. This is per-
haps unsurprising given the rapid economic deterioration of the 1990s. TB and
malaria are diseases of poverty and state incapacity, which flourish when public
health systems are inadequate, badly organized and  under- resourced, when govern-
ments are too weak and/or unmotivated to implement necessary organizational pre-
vention and control measures and when people are  under- nourished and have
compromised immune systems.
The DPRK’s prevalent strain of malaria causes sickness rather than fatalities
but is nevertheless a serious problem as malaria can be a chronic illness. Figure 4
shows that malaria cases fell from the 2001 peak of 300,000 to 23,409 reported cases
in 2008.58
TB is highly contagious and deadly; without appropriate treatment  two- thirds
of TB patients will die, yet it is curable and preventable.60 In 1997 there were a
reported 11,050 cases of TB compared to 97,665 cases in 2013.61 The 2013 incidence
rate, comprising new and repeat cases, was a high 429 (per 100,000 of the
population).62 Even allowing for  under- recording in previous years, the trend shows
a worsening TB incidence. The upward trend in the incidence of TB contrasts with
the global trend of a gradual decline in the incidence of TB. The DPRK incidence
rates are also much higher than the global average of 122 cases per 100,000 population
in 2012.63 More positively, however, the trend in mortality from TB is downwards.
Figure 5 shows the declining TB mortality rate from the late 1990s. In 2013, the
reported TB mortality rate (per 100,000 of the population) was 27, the same as the
Philippines and Pakistan.64
The DPRK’s economic recovery was not substantial enough to provide major
resources for national malaria and TB disease control and it relied heavily on inter-
national agencies for resources to support these campaigns. Nevertheless, control
of both diseases relies on effective transmission of public health messages and state
organizational capacity as much as resource capability. The relative success in control
of malaria and the reduction in mortality rates from TB indicate a revived organi-
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Figure 4. Malaria Cases DPRK, 1998–2011
Source: United Nations DPR Korea, “Fighting Malaria and TB in DPR Korea—A Partnership Approach.”59
zational capacity capable of systematically mobilizing administrative and medical
resources, including human resources, nationwide on a systematic basis. The con-
tinued rising TB incidence however shows that a large number of the population
are still highly vulnerable to disease and the breakdown of the figures shows that,
as with everywhere else in the world, a disproportionate number of vulnerable people
are women.66
In 2013, the reported global sex ratio for TB incidence was 1:7 (male: female).
In comparative terms, however, the DPRK sex ratio, while still disproportionate,
was slightly less so than world averages. The World Health Organization reports
that in the DPRK in 2013, for every one male, six women contacted TB.67 Nevertheless
the DPRK sex ratio reflected the global picture of TB incidence as disproportionately
affecting women rather than men.
The Big Killers:  Non- communicable Diseases (NCDs)
The WHO reported in 2009 that around 60 per cent of DPRK deaths were from
cerebrovascular diseases, cancer, chronic respiratory disease and neurological dis-
eases, based on data from 2002.68 In 2015, using data collected in 2008, the WHO
reported that “80.2% of all DPRK deaths were due to NCDs … and 46.5 percent of
all deaths were caused by cardiovascular diseases (2008).”69
The Domestic  Balance- Sheet
Continuing economic stagnation with only a modest recovery might create the
expectation of little improvement or even worsening in nutritional and health status
given the also modest population growth. Instead, the trends outlined above demon-
strate a recovery from the famine period, a reversal of worsening mortality rates and
a significant improvement in controlling and reducing the incidence of global killer
communicable diseases, with the important exception of TB. Even in the case of TB
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Figure 5. Mortality from TB Cases DPRK, 1990–2013 
Source: World Health Organization, “Estimated Tuberculosis (TB) Cases and Deaths, 1990–2012.”65
incidence, however, the sharp downward trend in mortality indicates an improve-
ment in government public health capacity.
The data also indicates that, irrespective of improvements in aspects of health
and nutrition, chronic problems of underdevelopment and post–Cold war economic
decline remained embedded. Life expectancy, for example, was reduced, as the pop-
ulation continued to face economic hardship. Prior to the famine period, between
1946 and 1993, population numbers had doubled, from 9 million to 21 million and,
at more or less the same time, life expectancy for the increased population had also
doubled, from just 38 years in 1936–1940 to 74 years in 1986.70 In the  post- famine
period,  life- expectancy dropped from 73 in 1993 to 69 in 2008, with the World Bank
reporting a slightly improved figure of 70 in 2013.71 These figures illustrate the declin-
ing capacity of the DPRK government to improve the  well- being of the population
compared to its Cold War capacity.
The health and nutritional status of mothers and young children remained pre-
carious. The high prevalence of  non- communicable diseases indicates an inability
to transmit effective public health messages, on smoking in particular and, also, very
likely, the continuing stress of an economically and politically stressful environment,
inadequate nutrition, and insufficient hot water and heating in the punishing win-
ters.
International Comparisons of 
DPRK Nutritional and Health Status
North Korea was officially classified by the World Bank as a low income country
and, as a low income country one might expect poor nutrition and health in the
population. Irrespective of  macro- economic status and policy, however, nutritional
and health status of a population does not necessarily correlate directly with eco-
nomic standing. India, for example, is categorized as a middle income countries, yet
has relatively high malnutrition and mortality rates. So far, this research has charted
nutritional and health status over time as a first cut in assessing the DPRK govern-
ment’s record. Now the analysis compares DPRK data and trends in nutrition and
health with those of other countries.
World Bank categorizations and data are relied on for comparative purposes
as these are largely uncontroversial and widely used internationally for policy analy-
sis. The geographical comparators are (i) global (ii) East Asia and the Pacific (includ-
ing developed and developing countries) and (iii) East Asia and the Pacific
(developing countries only).72 The economic comparators are with other low income
countries, and that of the least developed countries (according to UN classifications).
The choice of geographical categories reflects the DPRK’s regional location and the
choice of economic category reflects the World Bank categorization of the DPRK
(low income) and the common assumption that the DPRK is one of the most impov-
erished countries in the world (least developed). The following series of global com-
parisons chart malnutrition rates, mortality rates and life expectancy rates. This
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section does not systematically compare disease incidence as it was already alluded
to by global disease incidence comparators above. The time period covers the famine
period of the 1990s and the  post- famine era.
Malnutrition and mortality figures provide a standard “first cut” indicator of
any population’s poverty and  well- being. They therefore provide a useful way to
take the discussion back to the central theme of this article, which is to demonstrate
that the DPRK, in terms of the nutritional and health status of the population, is
not unique. DPRK malnutrition figures are far from the worst in the world and can-
not either be understood of representative of other low income countries as, since
the 2000s, DPRK malnutrition figures have been consistently better than for other
low income countries.
Malnutrition
The World Bank holds comparative data for the category of “severe wasting
prevalence” which in technical terms means “the proportion of children under five
whose weight for height is more than three standard deviations below the median
for the international reference population ages 0–59.” It does not, however, list com-
parative data for the broader category of wasting, which is the category used in Table
1 above and encompasses different degrees of low weight for height.73 Neither is
there a full data set for the DPRK nor relevant data for the UN classified least devel-
oped countries or East Asia and the Pacific as a whole. Comparative stunting data
for the world, other low income countries, and developing countries in East Asia
and the Pacific is sufficient, however, to indicate relative national nutritional status
and the comparative severe wasting data is useful as it indicates the relative risk of
 famine- like conditions for a population. Figure 6 shows therefore comparative stunt-
ing rates, as a way of comparing chronic malnutrition, and Figure 7 goes on to com-
pare severe wasting rates.
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Figure 6. Stunting (Low Height for Age) DPRK and World Comparators, 1990–2013
Source: World Bank, “World Development Indicators 2015.”74
Figure 6 shows extremely high DPRK stunting rates during the famine years
that were among the world’s worst. The DPRK stunting rate fell from 64 in 1998 to
28 in 2012, still worse than the global average, falling to 25 in 2013.75 The DPRK
remained some way off the developing countries of East Asia and the Pacific’s 2013
lower stunting rate of 12. The DPRK was, however, by no means unique in the high
prevalence of chronic malnutrition nor was its stunting rate the worst in the world.
The chronic malnutrition rate for all low income countries followed the global trend
for improved nutritional standards but remained at a very high 37 per cent in 2013.
Figure 7 shows, similarly to Figure 6, that severe wasting figures, characteristic
of  famine- like conditions, were worse than other low income countries even in 2002
when the economy was beginning to recover. By the late 2000s, however, the preva-
lence of severe wasting had dropped to 1 per cent, compared to static rates of severe
malnutrition at 3 per cent in low income countries.77 From 2009, the DPRK severe
wasting rate was on par with severe wasting rates for all developing countries in
East Asia and the Pacific.
Mortality Rates
Figures 8 and 9 show that infant mortality rates increased sharply during the
famine years while every other geographical group saw a downward trend in infant
mortality. They also show that DPRK infant and child mortality rates always
remained lower than the least developed countries, other low income countries and
word averages, even during the famine years.
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Figure 7. Severe Wasting (Weight for Height) DPRK and World Comparators, 1990–2013
Source: World Bank, “World Development Indicators 2015.”76
Figure 8 shows that the 2013 DPRK infant mortality rate was 22 and therefore
significantly lower than the world figure of 34.78 In 2013, DPRK infant mortality
rates were closer to those of East Asia and Pacific, including the developed and
developing countries in East Asia, than they were to other low income countries at
53, the least developed countries at 55, or to world figures.79
Figure 9 shows that comparative  under- five or child mortality rates display sim-
ilar trends to infant mortality rates. In 2013, the DPRK child mortality of 27 was
closer to the figure of 19 for East Asia and Pacific, including the developed countries
of East Asia, than it was to the world figure of 46 or to the significantly higher figure
for other low income countries at 76.81
What is different about the DPRK, as illustrated in figures 8 and 9, is the trend
between 2005 and 2009 (child mortality) and 2005 and 2010 (infant mortality)
towards a gradual worsening in infant and child mortality rates before the slight
improvement in subsequent years.83 In all other comparator geographical groups
the trend was towards sustained gradual reductions. It is this precariousness of the
improvement in DPRK infant mortality rates that alarms the international human-
itarian community, which has persistently called for targeted interventions to help
build sustainable improvements in life chances for infants and their mothers.
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Figure 8. Infant Mortality Rates DPRK and World Indicators, 1990–2013
Source: World Bank, “World Development Indicators 2015.”80
DPRK maternal mortality rates showed a similar but not identical pattern to
child and infant mortality in international comparative terms. The data is not suf-
ficiently granulated to tell whether there was a similar worsening of mortality in the
first part of the 2000s as with child and infant mortality. The overall comparative
patterns, however, remain congruent. Figure 10 shows that, similarly to infant and
child mortality rates, maternal mortality rates never reached the highs prevailing in
low income and least developed countries and remained below world averages.
The World Bank figures show the DPRK maternal mortality ratio in 2013 was,
at 87, closer to East Asia and Pacific’s figure of 71, including the developed countries
of East Asia (and 75 for the developing countries of East Asia and the Pacific), than
it was to the world figure of 210 or to the significantly higher figure for other low
income countries at 510.84
These figures do not show that mothers had an easy time in the DPRK. They
do however indicate that North Korean mothers faced similar conditions to many
women in large parts of the world.
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Figure 9. Child Mortality Rates DPRK and World Indicators, 1990–2013
Source: World Bank, “World Development Indicators 2015” (Washington, D.C.: International Bank for Recon-
struction and Development/The World Bank, 2015).82
Life Expectancy
Figure 11 shows that in 2013 DPRK life expectancy of 70 was close to the global
figure of 71.86 DPRK life expectancy was lower than for East Asia, whether including
both rich and poor states whose life expectancy rate was 75, or in comparison to the
developing states in the region, whose life expectancy rate was 74 in 2013.87 Despite
the fact that Figure 11 shows that, life expectancy in the DPRK remained better, even
throughout the famine period, than for low income countries and the least developed
countries, the data also indicates a government that struggles to maintain global
 well- being for its population as compared to either its own achievements in tis
respect in the Cold war period or as compared to its neighbors.
Poor, Improving, Uneven but Not Unique
A 2014 United Nations Commission of Inquiry report on DPRK human rights
abuses expresses the conventional view on the nutritional and health status of the
population in asserting that “[d]espite the large amount of international assistance
provided in the last 20 years, the malnutrition and stunting figures in the DPRK
continue to be very high and unevenly distributed. The Commission is particularly
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Figure 10. Maternal Mortality Rates DPRK and World Indicators, 1990–2013
Source: World Bank, “World Development Indicators 2015” (Washington, D.C.: International Bank for Recon-
struction and Development/The World Bank, 2015).85
concerned about the  on- going situation of the DPRK’s children.”89 The narrative 
of the report presents the view that nothing much has changed since the famine
years, that the health and nutritional status of the population is uniquely awful 
and government policies guilty of breaching the human right to food of the popu-
lation at large. The data presented above, however, indicates that this picture is erro-
neous.
The picture is erroneous in that it recognizes neither the scale of improvement
in health and nutritional terms since the famine years nor the comparative global
picture, which is that the nutritional and health status of DPRK citizens is fairly typ-
ical of low income developing countries. Indeed children’s health and nutrition is
significantly better on a number of indicators than in many other Asian countries
although naturally not on par with children in the wealthier East Asian countries—
especially Japan and South Korea. It also leads to a perhaps logically contradictory
position in that if the culpability for poor nutrition and health is placed unambigu-
ously with the government, unlike the UN agencies in the DPRK who also, for exam-
ple, point to the rise in world food prices and natural disasters as key explanatory
factors, then the logic must be that praise should be given to the DPRK government
for any improvements in disease incidence, malnutrition and mortality rates.
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Figure 11. Life Expectancy DPRK and World Indicators, 1990–2013
Source: World Bank, “World Development Indicators 2015” (Washington, D.C.: International Bank for Recon-
struction and Development/The World Bank, 2015).88
The picture is not even. The North Korean state has recovered the capacity to
implement effective national public health programmes in terms of the very suc-
cessful vaccination coverage and  anti- malaria campaigns, but there is still a lot more
to do to control the incidence of TB. The health and nutritional status of mothers
and infants, and others, remains far from satisfactory. Yet, tragically, the poor health
and inadequate nutritional status of many in the population in the DPRK is far from
exceptional  world- wide.
Why Does It Matter?
The contrary reactions of China and Russia vis a vis South Korea, Japan and
the United States to the UN COI report cannot be simply chalked up to differing
strategic interests; they reflect a lack of shared understanding of what, for most other
countries of the world, would be an uncontroversial  knowledge- base about basic
societal trends.90 This research therefore hopes to contribute to building a better,
common understanding of North Korean society so that the very real problems of
North Korean politics, economy and society can be addressed in a more coherent
and better informed manner. In North Korea, although income data is not robust
or meaningful, health and nutrition data can stand as proxy  well- being and poverty
indicators, and these indicators, as in other countries, can provide useful information
about patterns of societal change. Broadly, this research contributes to a shift in
North Korean Studies from securitized,  opinion- based discussions, in which all North
Koreans are either “victims or villains,” towards careful, qualified,  data- based analysis
of societal change in the  post- famine era of marketization in the DPRK.91
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